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The economic revenue model in the Internet is to collect revenues 
from users and distribute them among network players. The 
current collecting and distributing mechanism in the Internet 
has introduced network inefficiency and unfairness, which leads 
to the lack of incentive for further Internet investment. 
Our contribution of this work is to address two important 
aspects of the economic revenue model in the future Internet. 
First, we address the network inefficiency problems raised by the 
current Internet in the revenue collection stage. We analyzed 
how the concept of insurance can be adopted into Internet pric-
ing model to users. The insurance we analyze is namely price 
stability insurance, which aims to alleviate price fluctuations 
by congestion pricing by bearing a portion of users' congestion 
charges. 
We discussed the responses of price stability insurance from 
users with varies risk adversities. We proposed a coinsurance 
function such that users can enjoy minimum price fiuctua.tions 
while maintaining incentive for them to fine tune their network 
behavior. 
Second, we address the fairness issues in the revenue distri-
bution stage. We determine the existence and realizability of bi-
i 
lateral prices that can achieve fair revenue division among ISPs. 
In particular, we use Shapley value as the basis for deriving fair 
prices. Under a quite general topology and traffic model, we 
find that there exists prices that make the revenue division un-
der bilateral settlement equal to that calculated under Shapley 
value. The corresponding "fair price" exhibits several nice and 
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In the bird-eye view of the Internet, network players, such as 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), are sitting arbitrary in the In-
ternet cloud. They are interconnected with each other to es-
tablish connectivity. Users are connected at the edge of the In-
ternet cloud by edge ISPs, which provide connectivity for them 
in exchange for a revenue. The economic revenue model in the 
Internet is simple: In the revenue collecting stage, edge ISPs col-
lect revenues from users asking for connectivity; In the revenue 
distributing stage, revenues are passed among network players 
in the Internet. 
The current economic revenue model in the Internet is becom-
ing more problematic with the advancement of network tech-
nologies and the change of users' behaviors. In the revenue col-
lecting stage, users' behaviors change with the popularity of high 
speed broadband access. Their reckless use of network resources 
give much burden to the network capacity, nonetheless users do 
not have the correct incentive to make the network efficient; In 
the revenue distributing stage, the division of revenue heavily de-
pends on external factors such as ISP's negotiating power and 
their market shares, without regarding the fundamental contri-
bution of ISPs. We can foresee that the Internet is incubat-
ing a hostile environment to both users and network players, 
where the Internet would eventually become too wasteful and 
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inequitable to encourage further expansion or investment. 
In this paper, we would like to answer this question: how 
can we design a proper economic revenue model for the future 
Internet? Although this question is board and complicated to 
be analyzed thoroughly, we would like to address two key parts 
of the question. 
First, we focus on the revenue collecting stage of the eco-
nomic revenue model. There are vast amount of literatures on 
pricing mechanisms that can help improving network efficiency 
in the Internet. However, those mechanisms are often unaccept-
able to users since they are either too complicated or the pricing 
structure is uncomfortable to users. In our work, we help novel 
pricing mechanisms from literatures to become feasible to imple-
ment by introducing the concept of insurance. The introduction 
of insurance is beneficial in twofold: Not only it can reduce price 
fluctuations and data rate turbulences experienced by users, but 
also help ISPs to obtain a guaranteed return of investment under 
pricing mechanisms such as congestion pricing. 
Second, we focus on the revenue distributing stage of the eco-
nomic revenue model. The revenue distribution among ISPs in 
the Internet currently are non-cooperative and unfair. In our 
work, we discuss how network-wide cooperative settlement can 
be reached by using normal bilateral settlement method cur-
rently adopted in the Internet. As a fair criteria, we use Shap-
ley value as the standard of fairness to determine the fair price 
obtained by each ISP. We also showed how this network-wide co-
operative price can be obtained in an asymmetric environment 
with limited information. 
This paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we present 
the literatures related to economic revenue model. In Chapter 3, 
we focus on the revenue collecting stage of the economic revenue 
model, where we discuss how insurance can be applied to Inter-
net pricing to make novel pricing mechanisms feasible to both 
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ISPs and users. In Chapter 4, we focus on the revenue distribut-
ing stage of the economic revenue model, where we discuss how 
network-wide cooperative settlement can be achieved by current 
bilateral settlements. We conclude this work in Chapter 5. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
Related Works 
2.1 Pricing Mechanisms 
2.1.1 Current Situation 
Flat rate pricing [1] is the dominating pricing mechanism be-
tween ISPs and users. Flat rate pricing is to charge users a fixed 
charge for unlimited access to the Internet in a period of time, 
for example a month. Depends on how much a user pays, dif-
ferent upper bandwidth bounds are applied. There are no lower 
bandwidth bound for common users. This charging mechanism 
is simple to be implemented by ISPs as no monitoring system is 
required, in users' perspective, this mechanism is intuitive, and 
this completely predictable charging makes generally risk-averse 
users comfortable. However, flat rate pricing does not advocate 
efficient use of the Internet. Since fiat rate pricing charges users 
the same amount whatever they use the network, users tend to 
use the network recklessly and this causes network inefficiency. 
The phenomenon of network inefficiency is getting more se-
vere with the increase of last mile bandwidth. With broadband 
access, users do not limit their network applications to emails 
and web browsing. They are able to run inelastic applications 
such as video streaming, or high traffic applications such as 
peer-to-peer data transfer programs. A white paper from MIT 
4 
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Communications Future Group [36] mentioned that the behav-
ior change of users due to the introduction of broadband under 
flat rate pricing is one of the reasons of network inefficiency, 
which prevents ISPs to increase their network capacities. To-
gether with the traffic per user increases by the change of users' 
behaviors, the operating cost of ISPs increases. The revenue 
obtained by users, however, is not able to catch up with the 
increase of traffic under flat rate pricing. Normally 20% of the 
users contribute to 80% of the traffic, therefore, it is unreason-
able to charge flat rate to every user in proportion to network's 
total traffic as that will make 80% of the users unhappy. 
Odlyzko [34] discussed the issue of whether flat rate pricing 
should be replaced by a more efficient pricing mechanism in a. 
practical point of view. He argued that simplicity should win 
over efficiency. Since users do not mind paying more for a sim-
pler mechanism, implementing a simple mechanism is a win-win 
solution to both ISPs and users. While we agree that a simple 
pricing is vital for users' adaptation, we still need to overcome 
the huge amount of fluctuating data rates in the future Internet, 
which is not possible to be solved purely by flat rate pricing and 
over-provisioning. 
Currently, there are several solutions to tackle the increasing 
data rate for users and the decreasing of ISPs' per-unit band-
width profit. One method is to throttle users' traffic by setting 
an upper bandwidth bound. This method is pragmatic, how-
ever, is not reasonable when the network is not congested. In 
our point of view, the network should be classified as a com-
mon good. When the network resource is non-excludable, that 
is ones usage of the network does not prevent others from using 
the network, one should pay nothing for the network resource. 
Besides, throttling users' traffic also violates network neutrality 
44] as applications that require bandwidth higher than the up-
per bandwidth bound is strictly prohibited to the user because 
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of the network restriction. Another method to increase ISPs' 
profit is to provide service differentiation or content differentia-
tion. By paying a higher price, users can enjoy a better quality 
of service, or can use some addition applications provided by the 
ISPs. 
An alternate solution is to use other pricing mechanisms pro-
posed by varies researchers instead of flat rate pricing, which are 
presented in the following context. 
2.1.2 Proposed Pricing Mechanisms 
The pricing mechanism proposed currently can generally divided 
into four categories. The first type is fixed price charging, which 
flat rates are charged regardless of the users' network usage be-
haviors. The second type is traffic value based charging, which 
the charge of the network usage is reflected by how much a 
user value ones traffic. The third type is usage based charging, 
which the charge is proportional the actual traffic injected into 
the network. The forth type is congestion charging, which there 
are only charges applied to users when they initiate traffic when 
the network is congested. Detailed survey paper introducing 
varies pricing mechanisms can be found in [37, 12 
In fixed price charging ISPs set a fixed price by certain crite-
ria. Users subscribed to those ISPs pay the deterministic price 
for whatever bandwidth they use. Examples of such pricing 
scheme are flat rate pricing, Paris metro pricing [33] and edge 
pricing [40]. The concept of Paris metro pricing is to divide net-
work capacity into several equal bandwidth sub-channels, and 
to charge each sub-channel at a different flat rates. Using this 
setting, users with important applications switch to a more ex-
pensive sub-channel. This helps ISPs to reveal users' valuation 
of their traffic and make according charging. Edge pricing is 
to divide prices with respect to time rather than bandwidth in 
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Paris metro pricing. It is also referred as time-of-day pricing, 
as users with varies time-based usage behaviors are charged dif-
ferently. For instance, the charge for users who need to use the 
network during working hours are higher than users who only 
need network at off-peak hours. Therefore, we can expect that 
users who care about the additional charges at peak times shift 
their traffic to times when the rate is small. Such shifting of traf-
fic helps reducing bandwidth fluctuation in the network across 
time. Fixed price charging is ideal in terms of compatibility to 
the network, low accounting cost and user-friendly. It, however, 
is well known to be ineffective [11] because these pricing mech-
anisms does not limit users' usage, thus there are no incentive 
for users to use the network responsibly. 
Traffic-value based pricing is to ask users to give a value to 
their traffic, so that the network can obtain necessary informa-
tion to perform optimal network resource allocation and charg-
ing. Examples of such pricing are smart-market pricing [30 
and priority pricing [16]. Smart-market pricing is inspired by 
auctions. In smart-market pricing, each traffic issued by a user 
carries a bid with it, and the data rate allocation is an auction 
based mechanism. A number of traffic with the highest bids win 
and bandwidth is allocated to them. Act as an incentive to pre-
vent reckless bidding, a charge proportional to the bid is needed 
to pay for the traffic. This charging scheme provides good effi-
ciency as it is able to allocate resource to the most needy appli-
cations; however, building an auction system is complicated and 
often centralized. Priority pricing is on the other hand inspired 
by the priority mailing service. Similarly, priority pricing asks 
users to select a priority level of the traffic. The network then 
selects the ones with higher priority to be first delivered. Of 
course the higher the priority the traffic is, the more expensive 
the traffic charge is. One major drawback of traffic-value based 
traffic is the frequent decision making. Users are required to 
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make judgements on the value (or class) of each of their traffic. 
This decision frequency not only infeasible in practice, but also 
users are reluctant to making such frequent decisions. 
Usage based charging treats network bandwidth as commodi-
ties which users pay according to their usage. Example of such 
are g-th percentile pricing, expected capacity pricing [9] and ef-
fective bandwidth pricing [22]. In g-th percentile pricing, band-
width usage of a user in a period is divided the into several 
discrete time slots. The bandwidth usage charged to an user is 
determined by at the q-th. percentile time slot. The meaning of 
charging this way is to ask users to take responsibility to their 
peak data rates for ISP's bandwidth reservation use, rather than 
their overall bandwidth usage. Expected capacity pricing is to 
charge users by an estimation of the expected capacity rather 
than the actual bandwidth usage. Effective bandwidth pricing 
uses a mathematical approach to make sure the user declares 
the accurate mean and the deviation of their traffic pattern. 
Usage based charging gives incentive to users to better use the 
network since charges are incurred in each traffic. It docs not, 
however, provide enough incentive for users to adjust their usage 
at critical scenarios such as during congestion. 
Congestion pricing is to treat network as a common good 
when the network is not congested, and charge according to the 
congestion situation when the network turns into a private good. 
Example of this pricing mechanism are responsive pricing [29 
and smart-market pricing [30]. In responsive pricing, the per-
unit charge is proportional to the congestion index. At each time 
slot, network announces the congestion index to all users, users 
then respond with their optimized data rate according to the 
congestion index. This charging mechanism correctly identifies 
the properties of network capacity and gives correct incentive for 
users to adjust their usage during congestion. This mechanism, 
however, does not guarantee return on investment for network 
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providers. Also the charges for users are expected to experience 
fluctuations, which users are not feeling comfortable with. 
2.1.3 Congestion Pricing 
As part of this work is built mainly on congestion pricing, it 
worths more detail review on this topic. Early work related to 
congestion pricing is by Kelly [23]. He have successfully built a 
relationship between payment and data rate allocation by using 
the concept of shadow price. The shadow price is the dual vari-
able in the lagrange multiplier pattern, which its literal mean-
ing is the additional gain by increasing one unit of the con-
straint variable. In Kelly work, he introduced the concept of 
using shadow price as usage-based charges. By this formula-
tion, shadow price provides appropriate signal for users to chose 
their respective data rates, such that users' optimization prob-
lem, network's optimization problem and social's optimization 
problem can be simultaneously satisfied. 
The implementation of congestion pricing is discussed in Gibbens 
and Kelly [15]. It showed that by marking every packet when a 
resource is overloaded and charging each marked packet a price, 
the expected value of the total charge is precisely equals to the 
shadow price charging method stated previously. However, this 
result is only valid when the data rates across time are in Poisson 
distribution. Moreover, the work does not consider the situation 
where there are packet drops, either by noise or by congestion. 
In order for congestion pricing to be implemented in the net-
work, we need a better settlement method. 
For this issue, Briscoe et al proposed the concept of re-feedback 
'7] and re-ECN [5], which aims to feedback information such 
as congestion or delay information to the sender. One way of 
achieving this is to modify the time to live (TTL) counter in 
the TCP header. By adjusting the TTL counter at the sender 
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to a smaller value than default (255), the received TTL infor-
mation can be used as an indicator of the network situation. 
This work helps the right person in the transmission line(the 
sender) to know the network situation, and to obtain conges-
tion information for the payment. One doubt is that common 
routers might treat TTL as hop count because time is rather 
difficult to calculate. If that is true, using TTL might not be a 
valid tool to indicate congestion/delay time. The drawback is 
that the mechanism is not incentive compatible. Malicious ISPs 
along the path can assert additional TTLs, so that the signal 
sent back to the sender appears more congested and a higher 
congestion charge is incurred to the user. Another drawback of 
Briscoe's proposal is that the last reserved bit in TCP header 
will be used in his re-ECN proposal. 
To tackle the incentive compatible issue, Laskowski and Chuang 
25] mentioned how to prevent cheating and coalition of ISPs by 
implementing a rest of path (ROP) monitor at each ISP. The 
function of a ROP monitor is to determine the quality for the 
rest of the path to the destination. The paper claims that net-
work's innovation (such as incentive to increase capacity) and 
accountability is correlated. By making ISPs accountable for 
their behaviors when ROP monitors are implemented, innova-
tions can be encouraged. As a digressed remark, implementing 
ROP monitors still does not provide enough incentive for ISPs 
to undergo end-to-end innovations such as increasing capacities, 
as their sole work of innovation does not provide any difference 
when the rest of path does not innovate. 
2.1.4 Bandwidth Allocation Mechanism 
In users' perspective, their main goal is to maximize their util-
ity surplus, which is the difference between the utility obtained 
from receiving certain data rate and the cost of obtaining the 
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data rate. It is, therefore vital for us to understand how network 
allocates data rates in order to better acknowledge the users' de-
cisions under different data rate allocation schemes. A detailed 
review of fairness issues in bandwidth allocation could be found 
in the writing of Le Boudec [26 . 
The currently implemented data rate allocation method is 
max-min fair [4]. It is as simple as dividing the data rates evenly 
to all participated flows. It is easy to implement by using addi-
tive increase multiplicative decrease algorithm [8], however, it is 
known that rnax-miii fair mechanism is not fair to large flows, 
as more bandwidth could be obtained through small flows in 
proportion than in large flows. As an alterative, Kelly et al pro-
posed proportional fairness [23, 24]. In proportional fairness, 
the bandwidth is allocated in proportion to the requested data 
rate. Weighted proportional fairness is also introduce by Kelly 
23] that the bandwidth is determined by both the requested 
data rate and a weight factor for each flow. 
In weighted proportional fairness approach, users intend to 
transmit traffic sent out a value indicating their cxpected pay-
ment as the weight factor to the network. The network then 
calculates the data rates allocated to each user. Hajek and Yang 
17] showed that such mechanism is not strategy-proof. When 
users are strategic rather than merely a price-taker, the network 
efficiency of such mechanism would be low. Therefore, Yang and 
Hajek [45] proposed VCG-Kelly mechanism, which uses VCG 
mechanism as a wrapper to the original Kelly's mechanism to 
make the allocation strategy-proof. However, since VCG mecha-
nism is centralized in nature, which needs complete information 
of other users in order to find the second largest price, there are 
still works to be done to decentralize the mechanism, in addition 
to reduce the complexity of the mechanism. 
The term "fair" in the previous context is about dividing 
bandwidth across different flows in an indifferent way. However, 
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since each application is able to establish as many flows as it 
wish, the fairness criteria cannot stand when we view fairness in 
application level. In light of this, Briscoe[6] proposed cost fair-
ness to tackle this issue. He mentioned that instead of allocating 
data rates among flows, network should allocate congestion by 
congestion volume among users. This concept is similar to con-
gestion pricing, where each user can send out as many traffic 
as they wish, but if one traffic causes any congestion, the user 
is required to pay the congestion volume incurred by oneself. 
By using commercial means, flow rate can allocated under the 
invisible hand from Adam Smith. 
2.2 Revenue Distribution Mechanisms 
2.2.1 Current Situation 
Settlements between ISPs are generally divided into two cate-
gories, namely provider-customer settlements and peer-to-peer 
settlements. For provider-customer settlements, q-th percentile 
pricing is the common practice. The charging mechanism is 
composed of two elements. The first element is the promised 
bandwidth charge, which the charge is proportional to minimum 
bandwidth promised. This charge indicates the minimum band-
width a customer can get at any time guaranteed by the ISP, on 
the other hand, this charge also indicates the minimum band-
width the customer promises to pay, whatever he actually use 
it or not in the coming period. The second element is the tile-
based charge. Within a period (such as a month), the provider 
keeps record of the bandwidth used by each customer at each 
time interval (such as every five minutes). At the end of the 
period, each customer's bandwidth record is sorted, and the qth 
highest tile record is picked up as the amount of bandwidth 
that the provider has reserved for the customer for this period. 
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The actual tile-based charge is a function of the ^-th highest 
tile and the promised bandwidth charge, which the function in-
creases with increasing ^-th highest tile and decreases with in-
creasing promised bandwidth charge. This function advocates 
the customers to better estimate their promised bandwidth, in 
order to give providers a more stable income. An analysis of 
g-th percentile pricing is studied by Levy et a/[27], which it dis-
cussed responses of g-th percentile pricing in several scenarios, 
and how the decision of multi-homing is drawn. For peer-to-peer 
settlements, senders-keep-all mechanism is usually adopted [20 . 
There are no monetary settlement between two peered ISPs for 
traffic to either direction. 
As we can see, finding the optimal provider-customer rela-
tionship and peering relationship is vital to ISPs' profit in the 
current setting. Weiss and Shin [42] demonstrated the peering 
decision depends on market share of the ISP. By using a simple 
model, it showed that the two ISPs would establish a peering 
relationship if their market share is comparable such that their 
traffic at both sides are high enough to make the peering link 
profitable by both entities. However, in reality, the peering prac-
tice is much more complicated than profit. As stated by Norton 
32], the peering decision depends on series of political, market 
power, company strategy, and many other concerns. 
2.2.2 Novel Revenue Distribution Mechanisms 
There are several literatures proposing new revenue distribution 
mechanisms. One way to distribute revenues among ISPs fairly 
is to use economic theories to do the distribution. Ma et al [28 
analyzed how Shapley value can be implemented as a distribu-
tion mechanism in the Internet. By using Shapley value, the 
revenue obtained by each ISP is determined by its contribution 
to the connectivity of all traffic in the network. When revenue 
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is distributed by Shapley value, several axioms such as additiv-
ity, dummy, symmetric and efficiency are automatically fulfilled. 
The work showed that a Nash equilibrium can be achieved when 
such profit-sharing mechanism is adopted. Also, when Shapley 
mechanism is implemented, optimal routing is the best response 
of all network players. Although the outcome of this mechanism 
is quite ideal, the work does not consider practical issues, such 
as implementation concerns of the mechanism, and the incentive 
of doing the change. The centralized Shapley value calculation 
is also another problem that worths further research. 
He and Walrand [18] studies that if the revenue collected by 
ISPs are determined by their marginal demand on network ca-
pacity plus the traffic's lagrange multiplier (congestion shadow 
price), ISPs with smaller capacities obtain greater revenue in a 
non-cooperative setting. The analysis asserted that the revenue 
of each ISP is fair when it is proportion to ISP's bandwidth cost. 
By using weight proportional fairness criteria with respect to an 
ISP's cost, the ISP could obtain higher profit by collaborating. 
The drawback of this mechanism is that the proportional price 
requires global cost information. If there are only local informa-
tion, the mechanism experiences efficiency loss. Also the paper 
based on a strong assumption that the higher the cost means 
the higher the investment, therefore the higher the negotiation 
power to gain more revenue. In reality, cost cannot directly re-
flect negotiation power, as it may be incurred by environment 
issues, or by poor management for example. 
Accountability is always an issue in revenue distribution, since 
some network players may act malicious and lie about their cost 
in order to gain more. Feigenbaum et al [13] studied the ac-
countability issue and proposed a distributed BGP-based rout-
ing mechanism that is strategy-proof. The concept is to use 
VCG mechanism to determine the charge of the intermediate 
ISPs along the traffic path. By paying intermediate ISPs the 
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price of the alternate route minus their bandwidth cost, we can 
make sure that the best response to the intermediate ISPs are to 
indicate their true cost. However, this mechanism is not fair as 
the price charged by each ISP is greatly dependent on the cost 
of the alternate route, rather than the cost or the contribution 
of oneself. Another follow up question is the phenomenon of 
over-charging in VCG mechanism. It is possible that the sum 
of payment along the traffic path is much greater than the real 
cost of the path. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 3 
Problems in Revenue 
Collecting Stage 
Summary 
Currently, flat-rate pricing at access network in the In-
ternet is commonly known for its network inefficiency. 
As a remedy, literatures have proposed several pricing 
mechanisms, such as congestion pricing. However, the 
implementation of those mechanisms is not feasible as 
they appose too much risk to both ISPs and network 
users. In this analysis, we adopted the concept of insur-
ance to Internet pricing to mitigate the risk associated 
with those pricing mechanism. We also indicated how a 
price stability insurance can be set up in Internet pric-
ing. Using those insurance products, we show prelimi-
nary results of how ISPs design the insurance and how 
users would respond to them accordingly. 
16 
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3.1 Introduction 
In this paper, we introduce the concept of insurance into Internet 
pricing. Similar to the concept of insurance in financial systems 
-where buyers are able to alleviate their monetary loss in the 
case of accidents - insurance in Internet pricing aims to help 
buyers from experiencing price fluctuations due to usage based 
Internet pricing mechanisms. We study the price stability insur-
ance, which aims to mitigate price fluctuations resulted from the 
current novel Internet pricing mechanisms, such as congestion 
pricing [29]. By applying insurance to Internet pricing, we are 
able to make these Interne pricing mechanisms acceptable and 
feasible to be implemented in the perspective of network users. 
The current traffic volume and pattern in the Internet has 
transformed as high speed access network becomes common. 
Nowadays, the Internet carries more inelastic and bulky appli-
cations than ever. We foresee that the Internet will become the 
carriage for every communication tool in the near future. The 
Internet pricing and data rate allocation mechanism, however, 
is lagging behind the rapid change of the Internet. 
The current flat rate pricing in the Internet access network 
is more suited for the old days when Internet applications were 
mostly elastic and required little bandwidth. It was also ap-
propriate as the Internet was trying to attract more users and 
Internet measurements were difficult to irnpleinerit. Nowadays, 
however, the congestion-insensitive flat rate pricing is to blame 
for making the Internet suffer from network inefficiency. Flat 
rate charge does not provide incentive for network users to value 
their traffic, thus the network tends to be overused. This results 
in network congestions and decreased network efficiency. More-
over, the decrease of utility per capacity due to network ineffi-
ciency discourages ISPs to invest on additional capacity, which 
leads to a vicious circle of network congestion. 
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Although flat-rate pricing is are not welcomed by ISPs, it is 
preferable to users. Part of the reason is because of the risk 
adversity of common users. In general, users prefer stability 
and avoid variations. Flat-rate pricing promises a fixed rate no 
matter how much users consume. That helps users to minimize 
their risk on price fluctuation. Another part of the reason is 
the adversity of decision making. In flat-rate pricing, users only 
needs to ask one simple question once in a period - whether 
to subscribe or not. However, when it comes to usage based 
pricing, users need to make frequent decisions on how much 
traffic they send, or when they submit the traffic in order to 
minimize the amount they have to pay. The necessity for users to 
use the network tactfully make usage based pricing unattractive 
to users. 
How to provide incentive for better usage of the Internet? 
Several novel Internet pricing mechanisms are among those be-
ing widely discussed. One of the examples is congestion pricing 
29]. Congestion pricing implies that the user's payment is de-
pendent upon how congested the network is: users pay nothing 
when the network is not congested; however, when the network 
is congested, users pay extra for the volume of congestion they 
add. The final payment by the user in the period is the sum 
of all congestion volumes incurred by oneself. Congestion pric-
ing mechanism is feasible for implementation technically. The 
congestion situation can be observed by ISPs using packet drop 
rate, or by Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) marks. ECN 
marks are asserted only when there are explicit congestion sig-
nals. ISPs can collect ECN marks by inspecting the TCP header 
of each packet to receive congestion signals. ISPs can charge 
users by charging each ECN mark returned from their traffic 
for some unit price. Nevertheless, the application of congestion 
pricing is not ideal in economics terms and users' habit. 
There are three main flaws in congestion pricing. Firstly, 
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congestion pricing provides temptation for ISPs to artificially 
increase network traffic. Since the payment from users increases 
with congestion, there is incentive for ISPs to keep their links 
congested at all times to incur more charges. Secondly, conges-
tion pricing does not guarantee return on investment of ISP. As 
the payment from users fluctuates according to congestion, the 
ISP might not obtain sufficient revenue when the network is not 
congested. Thirdly is the users' adversities on price fluctuations 
and decision making as mentioned above. 
3.1.1 Desirable Characteristics of Internet Pricing Mech-
anism 
Before we mention the existing solution to tackle the flaws in 
congestion pricing, we would like to classify the important crite-
ria that an ideal pricing mechanism should preserve in the future 
Internet. The criteria can be divided into three categories: 
A) Efficiency Issues: the current flat rate pricing is known 
to be inefficient [12]. The ideal pricing mechanism should pro-
vide incentive for users to better utilize the Internet, including: 
1. Increases network efficiency: similar to electricity, unused 
network capacity is wasted. The pricing mechanism should 
encourage users to use the network when it is not congested 
for better usage of network resources. 
2. Increases economic efficiency: the pricing mechanism should 
increase social utility per capacity, so that resources are 
better allocated. 
B) User/ISP Adaptation Issues: the human factor is one 
of the most important criteria in deciding whether the pricing 
mechanism is practical. The ideal pricing mechanism should 
take into account the behavior of the users, such as: 
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1. Incurs minimal fluctuation in users' paynieiit - users should 
be able to estimate the amount they have to pay for that 
period in advance. 
2. Avoids frequent decision making by users - users should 
only need to make decisions once in a while. They should 
not need to make microscopic fine-tuning of their network 
usage behaviors. 
3. Guarantees Return on Investment - the total payment made 
by all users should be enough to cover the maintenance 
cost/building cost of the link regardless of the actual traffic, 
so that ISPs have enough motivation to establish links to 
any user; 
C) Social Issues: being a common good, the Internet is 
vulnerable to tragedy of commons. Therefore, an ideal mecha-
nism should help maintaining this common good status of the 
Internet, including: 
1. Provides incentive for users to avoid congestion - the pricing 
mechanism should encourage users to reduce or minimize 
their traffic during congested time. 
2. Avoids incentive for ISPs to artificially increase network 
traffic - ISPs should make no extra profit by artificially 
increase their network traffic. Instead, ISPs should increase 
their network capacities when congestion occurs. 
When we consider congestion pricing for example, we can 
see that it satisfies the efficiency issues, but it fails in user/ISP 
practice issues and social issues. There is literature to suggest 
the social issues in congestion pricing are solved, as shown below. 
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3.1.2 Existing Solution 
There have been attempts in literature to tackle the negative 
incentive of the ISPs to artificially increase traffic when the net-
work is not congested. Anderson et al. [2] introduced a contract 
and balancing mechanism to solve the problems. The idea is 
that congestion cost are bared by the users, rather than be-
tween ISPs and users. Since the balancing process is performed 
amongst users rather than to ISPs, the amount of payments re-
ceived by the ISP is fixed regardless of the network situation. 
Therefore, ISPs have no incentive to artificially increase network 
traffic. 
In the mechanism, each user is contracted for a portion of 
the capacity from the ISP for a period of time. During the 
period, when the user generates more proportion of traffic than 
his contracted capacity, he is require to pay the additional traffic 
based on the congestion situation of the network. In contrast, 
when the user generates less than his contracted capacity, he is 
being paid by other users who have used the network excessively. 
Nonetheless, this mechanism does not address the user habit 
issues. This mechanism implies additional risk of price fluc-
tuation to users when congestion is not severe. Consider an 
extreme case when there is no traffic in the network, the user 
who tries to use the network would bear the entire capacity cost 
cY when one sends a traffic as one is reasonable for the entire 
proportion of traffic in the network. The fiiictuation happens 
also when the users are not price-takers. If the users are being 
strategic, they would deliberately change their traffic pattern 
unpredictably and the resultant payment of users would vary 
further depending on other users' strategies. 
In this study, we focus on the user habit issues based on the 
contract and balancing model mentioned above. We show that 
by applying the concept of insurance into Internet pricing, the 
fluctuation of payment of user can be mitigated. That helps 
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solving the problems of congestion pricing and to make conges-
tion pricing feasible for implementation in terms of economics 
and user habit issues. 
3.1.3 Applying Insurance into Internet Pricing 
Applying insurance into Internet pricing is one of the ways to 
help users get use to congestion pricing. The insurance scheme 
we proposed is named price stability insurance, that tackles the 
issue of price fluctuation in usage-based pricing mechanisms such 
as congestion pricing. The nature of price stability insurance 
follows the concept of coinsurance. In coinsurance, the insurer 
charges the buyer a certain amount of insurance ahead of time. 
When there are situations that the insurant needs to execute the 
insurance, the insurer covers a certain percentage of the cost, 
while the insurant bares the remaining portion. The percentage 
of coverage by the insurant is proportional to the amount of 
insurance purchased in advance. 
Coinsurance is common in the field of health insurance [10 . 
In order to prevent the insurant from abusing the insurance, 
the insurance holder is obligated to pay for co-payment or coin-
surance. Co-payment is to ask users to pay for a fixed price 
every time they use the health insurance. In coinsurance, the 
insurant pays a percentage of the total medical cost, while the 
rest is covered by the insurance. Analogue to health insurance, 
price stability insurance asks the insurant to pay a portion of 
the congestion charge the user incurred by transmitting traffic, 
while the rest is covered by the insurance. 
Price fluctuation is not welcomed by network users as gener-
ally risk-averse users tend to feel more comfortable when they 
can estimate how much they need to pay in advance, even if they 
need to pay extra in exchange. The price stability insurance also 
avoids users from making frequent decisions - when price stabil-
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ity insurance is applied, users only need to decide the amount 
of insurance they have to buy once in a period, while for the 
rest of the time, users can be less cautious about the network 
condition as they are insured. 
There are three main advantages of using insurance as a rem-
edy to cushion price fluctuations for users. Firstly, the insurance 
mechanism is independent of the actual pricing mechanism used 
in Internet pricing. This does not only mean there requires no 
modification on the current Internet architectures and settings, 
the mechanism is also virtually transparent to ISPs. Secondly, 
the price stability insurance is based on a well established con-
cept of insurance. The mechanism of the insurance is simple, the 
implementation is easy and well studied. Thirdly, the concept 
of insurance is not a stranger to most users. Users should have 
no problem in understanding the process and it is not difficult 
for users to find the mechanism reasonable. 
In the mechanism of price stability insurance, a third-party 
insurance entity (the insurer) comes in and becomes the risk 
bearer. In the beginning of a period, the insurer provides a 
choice of insurance plans to individual network users. Users 
can choose to participate or not, or the amount of insurance 
they would like to purchase. During the period, users who pur-
chase insurance can be coinsured when they incurs any network 
charges due to congestion until the end of a period, then the 
insurance subscription process restarts. At the end of the pe-
riod, user pay a portion of the total congestion charge to the 
ISP, while the insurer bears the rest of the payment according 
to the insurance contract signed in the beginning of the period. 
Establishing price stability insurance can help users solve the 
user habit issues in the following three ways: 
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Payment predictable to both network and users 
When insurance is available, users are able to purchase insurance 
so that they incur less congestion charge when the network is 
congested. We can see that the more risk averse the user is, the 
more insurance the user will purchase. The effect of buying in-
surance is that the total payment can become more predictable. 
With higher the coinsurance coverage, the congestion charge de-
manded from ISP would become less significant. In an extreme 
case, a user would purchase enough insurance such that he/she 
was entitled to 100% coverage, the payment would be fixed for 
the entire period, similar to the current flat rate pricing. It is 
worth noting that although the user's price became predicable, 
the amount to be paid would vary in different periods as the 
coinsurance function to be offered would change according to 
the user's usage and behavior. 
No frequent decisions required 
Moreover, this insurance mechanism does not require frequent 
decision making. The amount of insurance to purchase would 
be decided only once in a period, say one month. In fact, the 
ISPs can always change the period time frame to better suit 
the users. To simplify the decision-making process, users could 
specify their desirable coverage rates to the ISP, allowing the ISP 
to automatically announce the price stability insurance payment 
in the beginning of the subscription period. 
Flexible for users to choose their protection level 
Another advantage of applying insurance is that this scheme 
is entirely flexible. Unlike conventional Internet pricing mech-
anisms that give users little choice or freedom, the insurance 
proposed here would not impose any obligation on users. De-
pending on the users' choice, users had the option to choose 
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from purchasing no insurance to enjoying flat-rate pricing. In 
another sense, the introduction of insurance would provide users 
the freedom to tailor-made their best level of protection. 
This chapter will be organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we 
mention the model used in this analysis, together with the Inter-
net pricing process in detail. We then introduce the insurance 
setup in Section 3.3, where we mention the criteria to formulate 
the coinsurance function, and how users with different risk ad-
versities response to such setting. In Section 3.4, we analyze the 
drawback of allowing users to subscript full insurance as the op-
timal solution, and introduce an alternate coinsurance function 
to solve problem. 
3.2 The Internet Pricing Model 
3.2.1 System Model 
We consider a simple network model with a set AT = { 1，…，N } 
of users subscribing to an ISP. The ISP is connected to the rest 
of the Internet by a single egress link with capacity Y. For the 
economic model, we consider a third party insurance company 
is introduced. Users can choose to purchase insurance with the 
insurance company freely. An illustration of the system model 
is provided in Figure 3.1. 
Each user n is characterized by a utility function Un(.), which 
is nonnegative, increasing, and strictly concave. This is the 
typical assumption for elastic data applications. 
We consider a discrete time model where a time period T is 
divided into several time slots t. For each time slot t e T, we 
assume the ISP observes the network congestion situation and 
announces the congestion unit price price p(t) to all users. The 
congestion unit price can be observed by recording packet loss 
situation in the network or by collecting ECN marks in the TCP 
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Figure 3.1: The system model adopted in this analysis. 
header of packets. In contract and balancing mechanism, the 
congestion unit price reflects how much per unit traffic a user 
needs to pay when his traffic exceeds that contracted. Given 
user n,s utility function, we can derive its demand as a function 
of the congestion unit price p(t), 
⑴） = a r g 力)） -p( t )XN(t ) ) , 
where Xn G (0, x^^^) is the date rate that user n requests. 
Given the value of p(t), the demand function determines the 
optimal data rate Dn(p{t)) that maximizes the difference be-
tween an user's utility and the correspondent traffic cost. Since 
the utility function [/(•) is concave, the demand function D(-) 
is convex and decreasing. 
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Figure 3.2: An overview of the charging scheme adopted in the charging 
model. Solid lines represented macro time events, while clotted lines repre-
sented micro time events. 
3.2.2 Decisions Time Scales 
Within each period T in our discrete time model, there are t eT 
time slots. Each time slot t is short enough that it is not possible 
for users to make any judgement or decision. An example of 
such duration would be half a second or one round trip time 
(RTT). The duration of T, on the other hand, is long enough 
such that users are comfortable to make long-term decisions. 
Such duration may be one month or more. 
We divide the time period into two decision time scales to 
better describe the decision behavior of users. An illustration of 
the two time scales is provided in Figure 3.2. 
1. The micro time scale: This time scale defines how users 
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fine-tune their immediate use of the Internet to maximize 
their utility surplus. The time scale of such is a time slot t. 
As fine-tuning behaviors in this time scale is not welcomed 
by users, we want to minimize the effect of decision making 
in micro time scale. At the same time, we want users to 
be cautious about their traffic, in order to provide higher 
network efficiency to the Internet. 
2. The macro time scale: This is the time scale for users to 
make strategic planning to achieve maximum utility. The 
time scale of such is a period T. In this time scale, users find 
it comfortable to decide their long-term Internet usage and 
to fine-tune their cost to maximize their surplus from using 
the Internet. We want users to make critical decisions in 
this time scale, and become less conscious of pricing details 
at micro time scales. That is the reason why the insurance 
purchasing process take place in this time scale. 
3.2.3 Micro Time Scale Pricing 
We assume the pricing in micro time scale is performed by con-
tract and balancing system. We consider the case when no pre-
payment is made for users, this is to allocate a fixed capacity 
charge among different users based on the proportion of con-
gestion volume each user incurs. For each micro time t, the 
ISP announces the congestion unit price p{t) to all users, and 
the users respond with their respective data rate x{t) by the 
demand function � ) • The congestion volume incurred by 
the users are therefore x{t)p{t). At the end of the macro time, 
the payment for each user is calculated by the proportion of 
congestion volume compared to the total congestion volume of 
all users. The payment of user n at the end of the macro time 
is: 
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Definition 3.2.1. The resultant payment of user n at the end 
of a period T under contract and balancing mechanism is defined 
as: 
p _ Y:teT^n{t)p{t) 
~ - E^eT^WpW ' 
where X{t) is the total traffic of all users at time Y is 
the network capacity and c is the per-unit cost of capacity an-
nounced by the ISP. For example, if the total congestion volume 
of a user contribute 10% of the total congestion volume, he is 
expected to pay 赛 to the ISP at the end of the period. It 
is important to note that the total payment received by the 
ISP in such case is always cY. That does not only remove the 
traffic-cheating incentive, but also allows ISP to obtain return 
on investment at all times. 
3.2.4 Macro Time Scale Pricing 
The macro time scale pricing is the insurance purchasing pro-
cess. In the beginning of a period, the third-party insurer an-
nounces a coinsurance plan to each network user. The coinsur-
ance plan is a tariff function, indicating how much insurance 
payment would lead to what amount of protection. We name 
this coinsurance plan a coinsurance function for future reference. 
Note that the coinsurance function is tailor-made for each user, 
depending on the user's previous statistical behavior on Internet 
usage and traffic pattern. This is similar to health insurance, 
where the insurer customizes users' insurance plan individually 
based on the individual's medical background. 
In this analysis, we assume the insurance company is able to 
obtain certain pricing information, such as a user's congestion 
charges history. We believe this information should be easy to 
retrieve. One way of achieving this is to ask users to submit 
their payment invoices to the insurer for each period. 
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After the coinsurance function is known, each user then chooses 
how much insurance one would like to purchase, based on the 
demand on network usage and the degree of risk adversities to-
wards price/data rate fluctuations. Upon purchasing insurance, 
a portion of one's payment due to congestion can be alleviated. 
User n，s overall payment for the entire macro time T is calcu-
lated as: 
Definition 3.2.2. The total charges a user n pays in macro 
time period T is 
mn + r\Jjnn)En, 
where rrin is the price stability insurance payment and rn(-) is 
the coinsurance function. En is the payment from the contract 
and balancing mechanism in micro time scale from Definition 
3.2.1. 
With the effect of the irin in the coinsurance function, the 
second term of the equation is small when enough price stabil-
ity insurance is purchased. Therefore, serious price fluctuations 
from micro time transactions can be alleviated. A list of param-
eters used in this analysis is presented in Table 3.1. 
We will present how the price stability insurance is set up in 
the next section. 
3.3 Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function 
In this section, we investigate how the insurer design the coin-
surance function r(-) and how users respond to the coinsurance 
function by purchasing price stability insurance. 
We then introduce some of the concerns that may affect the 
users' choice of insurance payment. For instance, how this insur-
ance payment affects the behavior of users, and how asymmetric 
information changes the nature of insurance. Based on the prob-
lems, we fine-tune our original coinsurance function mechanism 
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Table 3.1: Parameters used in the model 
System parameters 
N" A set of users subscribed to the ISP 
Un{-) Utility function of user n operating application A 
Dn{-) Demand function of user n operating application A 
Y network capacity of the ISP 
c cost per unit capacity-
Pricing parameters 
p(t) Congestion unit price at time slot t E T 
En Congestion charge of user n for the current period 
f) Congestion probability 
Insurance parameters 
r„(-) Actuarially fair coinsurance function for user n 
rP(-) Premium coinsurance function for user n 
rUn Insurance purchased by user n 
P Base congestion charge in the coinsurance function 
a Premium factor 
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to remedy these problems in Section 3.4. 
3.3.1 The Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function 
The first question we want to ask is to determine the most ap-
propriate coinsurance function for different users r(-). One way 
to setup the coinsurance function is through calculating the ac-
tuarially fair coinsurance function. The actuarially fair coinsur-
ance function is to ensure the insurer does not gain any expected 
profit by issuing the insurance, that is the insurance company 
should have zero expected profits, as defined in Definition 3.3.1. 
Definition 3.3.1. The actuarially fair coinsurance function r(-) 
defined such that the following condition is true: 
p ( m — / ( r ) ) + ( l — p ) ( m ) = 0， 
where / ( . ) is the indemnification function by the insurer. The 
indemnification function is defined as the amount of money the 
insurer needs to pay when the insurant execute their insurance. 
In this scenario, the indemnification is the coinsured part of the 
user's contract and balancing mechanism payment the insurer 
needs to pay. Moreover, we use the variable p G (0,1) to indicate 
the probability of congestion. 
Definition 3.3.1 is reasonable even if the third party insur-
ance company is not a non-profit organization. In order to bet-
ter illustrate this issue, let us classify users into different risk 
adversity levels and explain how they react to risk. 
We classify users into three types according to their different 
reactions to risk. These are risk-seeking users, risk-neutral users 
and risk-averse users. The behavior of these three types of users 
are shown in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 is referred as the expected 
utility function, or von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
in economics [41]. The term x can be any entity, one example 
of such is the amount of money acquired. 
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Risk-seeking users (asterisk line) are presented as a convex 
curve. Their utilities of the expected value is less than their 
expected utility from uncertainties. This is due to the fact that 
they gain higher satisfaction when they obtain higher payoff, 
even though that possibility is small. As an illustration, when 
such users play a coin-flipping bet, where they get one upon 
winning and get nothing when they lose (the expected value is 
0.5), they are willing to pay higher than 0.5 for the bet. 
Risk-neutral users (asterisk line) are presented as a straight 
line. Their utilities of the expected value equals to their ex-
pected utility from uncertainties. That means their utility is 
proportional to the quantity of entity they obtain. In the coin-
flipping game, they are willing to pay up to 0.5 to play. 
Risk-averse users (triangle line) are presented as a concave 
curve. Their utilities of the expected value is greater than their 
expected utility from uncertainties. For the coin-flipping game 
with expect value of 0.5, they are only willing to pay less than 
0.5 for the game. 
As an insurance company, it could make profit by bridging 
the utility difference between a risk-averse user and the expected 
revenue obtained (that is to absorb the risk premium of the 
user). Since risk-averse users tend to pay more than their ex-
pected utility, the insurance company can make a profit by this 
difference in exchange for a risk-protection insurance plan. 
By calculating Definition 3.3.1, we are able to obtain the 
actuarially fair coinsurance function in this model: 
Theorem 3.3.2. The actuarially fair coinsurance function rn{-) 
of user n under contract and balancing mechanism defined in 
Definition 3.2.1 is: 
rn[mn) = 1 —, 
pi^n 
The term pEn is the expected payment under contract and 
balancing mechanism for the macro time T. We refer this term 
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Figure 3.3: The expected utility function for users with different risk adver-
sities. 
as the base congestion charge and represent it as j3n in later con-
text. Based on the traffic behavior of different users, the actuar-
ially fair coinsurance function are different. In the beginning for 
each macro time, the ISP announces this coinsurance function 
to different users with different base congestion charges. Then 
the users respond with their optimal insurance charges. Note 
that the smaller the value of r(-), the greater the user is be-
ing insured. The proof of Theorem 3.3.2 is stated in Appendix 
A.1.1. 
3.3.2 Properties of the Actuarially Fair Coinsurance 
Function 
After the actuarially fair coinsurance function is defined, we 
analyze the properties of the coinsurance function for different 
types of users. 
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Proposition 3.3.3. The actuarially coinsurance function r(-)= 
1 when rn = 0； and r(.) = 0 when rn = [5. 
This proposition shows that when no insurance is purchsed 
(m = 0), there are no coinsurance paid by the insurer (r = 1); 
however, when the user purchases the base congestion charge P 
in macro time T, he is eligible to enjoy 100% discount for all 
congestions he incurs. This turns the pricing mechanism into 
flat rate pricing. 
In terms of implementation, since the actual congestion pay-
ment by contract and balancing mechanism is only reveled after 
the macro time T, the base congestion charge used in the coin-
surance rate function can be determined by statistical average of 
a user's traffic pattern and congestion incurred. We will discuss 
the implementation details in our numerical example in Section 
3.3.4. 
Proposition 3.3.4. The actuarially fair coinsurance function r 
is monotonic decreasing with the price stability insurance m. 
This proposition shows that users always get better insured 
when they purchase more price stability insurance m. However, 
the actual protection obtained by each user is different for the 
same amount of payment, as the base congestion charge of differ-
ent users varies, depending on individual's coinsurance function 
^n(-)-
3.3.3 How Much Insurance Should a User Buy? 
After the actuarially coinsurance function r(-) is determined, 
one may ask how much insurance a user should purchase when 
such function is known? To answer this question, we need to 
solve the following optimization problem: 
msixpV(w — rn - /3) + (1 - p)V(w — rn), (3.1) 
m 
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Here we assume the congestion probabilities p are the same 
for the entire macro time T, that is ( p � = p ， V t G T) for 
simplification. Note that this only assumes the probability of 
congestion to be the same, however the degree of congestion 
p{t) can vary for each time slot t eT. Using Equation (3.1), we 
first find the optimal insurance charge m* for risk-averse users: 
Proposition 3.3.5. The solution of Equation (3.1) for risk-
averse users is: 
m* 
The proof of Proposition 3.3.5 can be obtained in Appendix 
A.1.2. This value equals to the base congestion charge. When 
such price stability insurance is paid, the portion of coinsurance 
paid by the user is: 
1 + � ’ 
which a risk-averse user's best response of obtaining the coin-
surance function is to purchase full insurance. This is equivalent 
to paying the total expected congestion charge in the beginning 
of the macro time, in order to prevent being charged extra in 
the coming macro time. Note that all risk-averse users of any 
degree purchase full insurance as their best responses because 
of the concavity of the expected utility of risk-averse users. 
Proposition 3.3.6. The solution of Equation (3.1) for risk-
seeking users is m* = 0. 
The proof of Proposition 3.3.6 can be found in Appendix 
A.1.3. The result is intuitive as risk-seeking users does not 
treasure stable payments. Their utilities raise when there are 
chances that their payments are smaller than the expected pay-
ment for some macro time. As a result, they tend not to pur-
chase any insurance. 
Proposition 3.3.7. There are infinitely many solutions of Equa-
tion (3.1) for risk-neutral users in 0 < m* < (5. 
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The proof of Proposition 3.3.6 can be found in Appendix 
A.1.4. Risk-neutral users obtain the same utility for any m*, as 
there is no difference between their utilities and the expected 
charges under this actuarially fair coinsurance function. They 
get the same utility surplus by buying (or not buying) any in-
surance. 
3.3.4 Numerical Examples 
We provide a realistic numeric example to show how the mech-
anism of insurance works in practice and how price stability 
insurance helps users to avoid experiencing huge price fluctua-
tions. 
In this example, we illustrate the effect of price stability in-
surance by a simple model. Before we describe the model in 
detail, let us define the utility function and demand function 
used in the model: 
Definition 3.3.8. The utility function of a user n transmitting 
at a data rate x is: 
Un{x) 二 (3.2) 
where Un is the magnitude of user n's utility. The greater the 
Un, the more utility the user obtains by transmitting traffic. It 
can be used as a measurement to determine how important ones 
traffic is. Based on the above, we can formulate the demand of 




The proof is intuitive and it is omitted here. 
In the model, there are a random number of users subscribed 
to the network. We assume all users are risk-averse by nature. 
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Figure 3.4: Payments for insured users (asterisk link) and uninsured users 
(circle line). 
Each user n has a utility function with a distinct value Un. We 
assume that, because there are so many users in the network, 
an user's alternation of data rate has virtually zero effect to the 
congestion of the network. We model the congestion unit price 
p as a random binomial distribution. We also assume that all 
users demand network traffic at all times. 
In the beginning of each macro time scale, the insurance com-
pany announces the actuarially fair coinsurance function to each 
users. The base congestion charge the insurer sets to each user 
is the running mean average congestion charge of the previous 
ten macro times. In micro time scale, the ISP announces the 
congestion unit price p{t) at each time slot t, and all users re-
spond to the unit price with their demand function D{p{t)). At 
the end of the macro time, users settle the congestion payment 
by paying the uninsured portion of the congestion charge to the 
ISP based on the contract. 
Figure 3.4 shows the users' payment across macro times. Al-
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Figure 3.5: Payments for user with/without insurance charge when a sudden 
change of demand happens at macro time 10. 
though the actual payment varies across macro times, users' 
payments are predicable at the beginning of the macro time if 
they have purchased full insurance. 
Compared with users that have not purchased any insurance 
(circle line), purchasing price stability insurance help reducing 
the fluctuation of payment across macro times. Note that as 
actuarially fair rate is adopted in this example, the mean value of 
the two insurance total payments are the same. In such case, the 
best response of a risk-averse user is to purchase full insurance. 
The coinsurance function is calculated based on the assump-
tion that a user's behavior would not change upon purchasing 
the insurance. Next we look into the phenomenon when a user 
tries to deviate from one's normal behavior after one purchases 
some price stability insurance. Figure 3.5 shows a scenario where 
a user suddenly multiplies his traffic by 10 times at macro time 
10. Assume the user with insurance (asterisk line), his payment 
at macro time 10 is far smaller than one without insurance (cir-
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cle line) as a portion of the congestion charge is cushioned by 
the insurer. However, as a penalty, the user would suffer from 
a higher base congestion charge for ten periods when running 
mean average is used to determine the base congestion charge. 
Therefore, the best traffic response of a user in long run is to 
maintain ones normal traffic pattern. 
As an analogy, the running mean average calculation is sim-
ilar to the no-claim discount in auto-mobile insurance. An ac-
cumulative discount is applied to the insurance charges of the 
automobile insurance when the user does not file any claims. 
When the user experiences any accidents that results in insur-
ance claims (analogy to causing unexpected congestion), the 
discount wears off (a penalty is applied) and the user would 
be uninsured for a number of periods before enjoying the same 
discount rate again. 
3.4 Premium Coinsurance Function 
In the previous section, we showed that if the coinsurance func-
tion is actuarially fair, the best response of risk-averse users is 
to purchase full insurance, that is to pay the base congestion 
charge in advance. In the network's point of view, however, full 
insurance of users is not a preferred option for ISPs, as providing 
full insurance might change the behavior of users. In the insur-
ers' point of view, it is difficult for the insurer to determine the 
full insurance coinsurance function by statistical information. 
In this section, we show the problems raised by actuarially 
fair coinsurance function, and we propose an alternate coinsur-
ance function to remedy the problems. We then analyze the 
responses of different users with a iiurnerical example to better 
illustrate the performance of such insurance. 
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3.4.1 Problems of Allowing Full Insurance 
The first problem of issuing full insurance is moral hazard. Moral 
hazard is the phenomenon that a user behaves differently when 
part of one's risk is insulated by insurance than under full risk. 
More information on moral hazard in economics can be found in 
35, 39]. Without insurance, the demand of a user at micro time 
t is D{p{t)). However, when the user purchases some insurance 
m > 0 and enjoys a coinsurance of r(m), there are incentives 
for the user to change his demand to D{T{m)p{t)) > D{'p{t)) in 
the micro time. This phenomenon becomes more apparent when 
more insurance is bought. To an extreme, when full insurance 
is purchased, we can expected that the user's demand is always 
D(0) = a;臓 
Proposition 3.4.1. The maximum deviation of demand hap-
pens when full insurance is purchased. Considering the following 
optimization problem: 
max D(r(rri)pit)\ — D (r(m + Am)p{t)), 
m \ / V 
The solution of the optimization problem is 
m = 
that is full insurance as indicated in Proposition 3.3.5. 
The proof can be found in Appendix A.1.5. One example of 
this phenomenon is dinning in a buffet. Since ordering extra 
in a buffet does not raise the total bill (ie. it is risk-free), peo-
ple generally behave differently under such setting and consume 
more than under normal circumstance. If full insurance is the 
best response of the users, we can expected that users tend to 
over-consume network bandwidth and this leads to network in-
efficiency as we observe from the current flat rate pricing in the 
Internet. 
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The second problem of issuing full insurance is that the actu-
arially fair coinsurance function r is calculated using statistical 
information such as the past congestion charges of each user. As 
those records are totally statistical, the insurance company is at 
risk that the user will not behave similarly in the next macro 
time. 
Assuming that the congestion unit price p{t) in the actuari-
ally fair coinsurance function in Theorem 3.3.2 is known before 
the macro time. For example, we can foresee that the congestion 
unit price would be larger during working hours, and the base 
congestion charge of the coinsurance function is determined by 
the user's traffic at the previous macro time. Now, the user who 
knows his upcoming usage in the next macro time purchases his 
optimal price stability insurance charge by solving the following 
optimization problem: 
. miUrn rn + r{m)E 
. ^ / E\ 
min^ E + m 1 - — , V pJ 
where (5 is the base congestion charges of the user, which is 
a statistical value of the previous macro time Tp and E is the 
congestion charge at the current macro time. The range of m 
is in (0’ a) and E is a function of which is the known data 
rate of the user in the coming macro time. The solution of this 
linear function depends on the slope of the function: 
* / P when En > P, 
m = < 
[ 0 when En < 
It shows that when the user acquires more information than 
the ISP does, the user will only choose between paying a full 
insurance or not paying any insurance at all. When the user has 
a better knowledge on the traffic pattern he will use in the next 
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macro time x(t) for example, he has a better idea on the next 
congestion charge En, and can optimize his choice of insurance 
using the above rationale. This causes the insurance mechanism 
to fail as the insurance is implemented to alleviate price fluc-
tuations, rather than acting as a tool to arbitrage user's utility 
surplus. 
To remedy the problem of issuing full insurance, we need to 
adjust the actuarially fair coinsurance function such that risk-
averse users' best responses are not paying full insurance. One 
method to achieve this is to set up another coinsurance function 
that apply some extra charges if users require full insurance, as 
explained in the next subsection. 
3.4.2 The Premium Coinsurance Function 
In this subsection, we formulate the premium coinsurance func-
tion to achieve the following two requirements: 
1. Pull insurance should not be the best response of users. 
Risk averse users should not purchase full insurance for 
their best response in order to mitigate the data rate devi-
ation caused by moral hazard, and; 
2. A premium in addition to the base congestion charge is 
needed for users to purchase full insurance, so that it is 
still open for users to purchase even though full insurance 
is not an optimal response. 
One way to achieve the above two criteria is to implement a 
premium factor a to the actuarially fair coinsurance function 
r(-) as follows: 
Definition 3.4.2. The premium coinsurance function rate for 
user n is defined as: 
P^n 
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Figure 3.6: When premium factor a increases, less premium is added to the 
actuarially coinsurance function, therefore the optimal insurance payment of 
users increase. Here we normalized the base congestion charge as 1. 
where a G (0,1). The premium coinsurance function equals 
to the actuarially fair coinsurance function when a = 1. We 
first analyze this premium rate r^ by determining the optimal 
insurance charges of users with different risk adversities: 
3.4.3 Properties of the premium coinsurance function 
Proposition 3.4.3. The optimal price stability insurance trP* 
under premium coinsurance function r^ is increasing in a for 
risk-averse users. 
The proof of the proposition is shown in Appendix A. 1.6. Fig-
ure 3.4.3 shows one example of the relationship between the pre-
mium rate distortion factor a and the optimal insurance charge 
mP*. We can see that as the premium factor a decreases (more 
premium is required to obtain the same coinsurance), the opti-
mal insurance payment mP* decreases as well. This is similar to 
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the dinning scenario, where one needs to decide between a buffet 
or charge by order in the restaurant. When the buffet charge is 
unproportionately higher than ordering it separately (a is low), 
one would choose charge by order and not a buffet despite being 
risk-averse. 
Proposition 3.4.4. The optimal insurance charge mF* under 
premium coinsurance function r^ is increasing in users，initial 
weight w for risk-averse users. 
This proposition is easy to observe from the result of Ap-
pendix A.1.6. The proposition is intuitive to the fact that wealth-
ier risk-averse users are more willing to pay extra for greater 
satisfaction by reducing their payment fluctuations. Note that 
in premium coinsurance function, the more insurance one buys, 
the greater the mean total payment one needs to pay. This is 
different from the actuarially fair coinsurance function that the 
mean total payment is independent to the amount of insurance 
purchased as shown in the numerical example in Figure 3.4. 
Proposition 3.4.5. The optimal insurance payment mP* of risk-
seeking and risk-neutral users under premium coinsurance func-
tion rP is mP* = 0. 
The proof of the proposition can be found in Appendix A.1.7. 
The proposition follows that since the premium coinsurance 
function is unfair to users (in a sense that users need to pay 
more in average when they purchase the same discount rate), 
users who are not averse to risk should not buy this insurance. 
In general, users are generally risk averse in nature [19 . 
Therefore we can expected that there are demand for premium 
coinsurance function when it is released, albeit its “ unfair" na-
ture. Note that full insurance is still possible if users are willing 
pay This price, however, is not a best response to users when 
a <1. 
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Figure 3.7: Payments for insured users (asterisk link) and uninsured users 
(circle line) under premium coinsurance function 
3.4.4 Numerical Example 
In this subsection, we want to use an numerical example to illus-
trate how premium coinsurance function works under a realistic 
model. 
The environment setting of this model is the same as the nu-
merical example in Section 3.3.4, except that the coinsurance 
function used in this example is the premium coinsurance func-
tion. We set the premium factor a to 0.7 for the simulation. 
Figure 3.4.4 shows the result of the simulation. There are two 
observations in the simulation. Firstly, similar to the actuari-
ally fair coinsurance, the premium insurance can help reducing 
the fluctuation of users who bought insurance, however, we can 
see the range of variance is larger than in actuarially fair coin-
surance. It is because under premium coinsurance, the best 
response of user is to purchase less insurance than the full in-
surance. With less insurance purchased, the user is required to 
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bear a larger portion of the eventual congestion charge and thus 
the fluctuation is larger. 
Secondly, the mean payment of the insured users is higher 
than the mean payment of the uninsured users. Unlike actuari-
ally fair coinsurance where the expected payment of insured and 
uninsured users are the same, the premium coinsurance incurs 
an additional charge to users who purchased insurance, there-
fore the expected amount of payment of users with insurance is 
higher. Although users required to pay more for the insurance, 
they are still willing to pay the insurance for an appropriate 
premium factor a. 
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Chapter 4 
Problems in Revenue 
Distributing Stage 
Summary 
The Internet includes thousands of Internet service 
providers (ISPs) which are interconnected to provide 
connectivity and service for end-users. Traditionally, the 
settlement between the ISPs are determined based on 
bilateral agreements that result from pair-wise negotia-
tions. Although this settlement mechanism is intuitive 
and easy to implement, it does not encourage network-
wide cooperation, as the bilateral charges typically do 
not lead to a fair division of revenue among all ISPs that 
are involved in carrying the same flows of traffic. This 
problem is getting more severe with various emerging 
new Internet business models. 
In this paper, we try to determine the existence and 
realizability of bilateral prices that can achieve fair rev-
enue division among ISPs. In particular, we use Shapley 
value as the basis for deriving fair prices. Under a quite 
general topology and traffic model, we find that there 
exists prices that make the revenue division under bilat-
eral settlement equal to that calculated under Shapley 
value. The corresponding "fair price" exhibits several 
nice and desirable characteristics. Moreover, it could be 
realized approximately. 
CHAPTER 4. PROBLEMS IN REVENUE DISTRIBUTING STAGE 50 
4.1 Introduction 
The Internet is the result of interconnecting many networks, 
each operated by a separate ISP. The Internet service, as en-
joyed by the customer of all ISP networks, is however a service 
provided collectively by all ISPs. A customer of the Internet 
service subscribes to an access ISP. For this service, the access 
ISP collects a charge from each subscriber. Since the service is 
accomplished by multiple ISPs, a fundamental issue is how ISPs 
should divide up this charge. 
Based on the design of the Internet, the unit of network ser-
vice is a packet transported. This is a rather miniscule unit 
for measuring service, not to mention the task of dividing the 
charge among multiple parties contributing to the service. By 
convention (established historically), ISPs charge users monthly 
on a flat rate basis (like an all-you-can-eat buffet), and settle 
account monthly on a bilateral basis between ISPs who are con-
nected with each other. There are two most common types of 
bilateral peering relationships between ISPs. In the first type of 
peering relationship, one ISP is considered as a transit provider 
for the other ISP, and the transit provider charges its customer 
ISP for amount of traffic transit through the provider network. 
The second type of peering relationship is a totally collabora-
tive one. Two ISPs exchange traffic and deem to benefit from it 
mutually and forego any charges to each other. Although this 
all seems a rather sloppy business practice, it keeps the effort in 
book-keeping to a minimum. This minimalist approach is also 
totally decentralized, without the need for all kinds of coordina-
tion between ISPs. 
In recent years, new business models (using Internet services) 
emerge; for example, Internet content providers (ICPs) are able 
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to generate significantly higher levels of revenues [31]. This 
prompted re-examination of how the benefits of network ser-
vices should be divided between various players. One study 
28] specifically re-examined the issue of how ISPs should share 
the total revenues of the Internet service and proposed Shapley 
values as a potential solution. Shapley value refers to an ax-
iomatically derived formula for fairly dividing a prize among a 
set of contributors in a general economic setting. By forming 
an coalition, it is argued in [28] that the ISPs will find more 
optimal routes and maximize the overall value of the Internet. 
In this work, we ask a different question: Can the current 
bilateral peering between ISPs, under proper pricing strategies, 
lead to a cooperative settlement as if the ISPs are all in a coali-
tion? This proposition is not entirely unreasonable, since ISPs 
do realize the positive network externality in the interconnected 
network. There are actually two parts to this question: a) does 
there exist fair pricing (defined as prices in bilateral peering that 
produce Shapley value as settlements)? and b) how feasible and 
likely ISPs will choose such fair prices in their peering agree-
ments. For a general set of ISP network topologies and traffic 
models, we show the answer to (a) is true. We then show some 
preliminary results to (b). 
This work is organized as follows. We formulate the system 
model and settlement model in section 4.2 and 4.3. In section 
4.4, we show that in a symmetric network setting, we could 
obtain the fair prices that produce Shapley value and show some 
desirable properties of the fair prices in Section 4.5. We further 
consider how fair prices can be calculated in the more general 
asymmetric topology in Section 4.6. In Section 4.7, we show how 
the fair prices can be locally approximated without knowing the 
global network information. 
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Figure 4.1: An illustrative example of the topology and traffic model. Here 
we have three tiers of ISPs, with three different links: transit links (solid 
lines), peering links (dotted lines), and multi-homing links (dash lines). For 
a unit of traffic sent by an end-user of leaf ISP node A (greyed circle), the 
values beside some of the links represent the probability that the traffic goes 
to a particular height. 
4.2 System Models 
4.2.1 Topology Model 
We use an AS-level hierarchical model to capture the essence 
of the current tier-based Internet. The hierarchical model has 
been extensively used in related literatures (eg. [20], [21]). We 
assume that each ISP contains only one AS.i Figure 4.1 is an 
example of such topology. A set of Af = { 从 Vt G { 1 , … ， T } } 
ISPs is located at different tiers, where the set of ISPs in tier t 
is denoted by A/i. The highest tier (tier 1) is the backbone tier 
and the lowest tier (tier T,T = Sin Figure 4.1) connects to end-
users. For a particular ISP node n G Aft with t G { 1 , . . . , T — 
1}, it serves as the provider for a fixed number of tier t + 1 
iFor an ISP that contains more than one AS, it is enough to think it as one AS in our 
model. 
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ISPs (i.e., customers). Different ISPs can have different number 
of customers. Meanwhile, the same ISP can purchase several 
different upstream links simultaneously. In this case, we define 
one of the providers as the primary provider. In Figure 4.1, the 
primary provider ISP of both node A and node B is node C. 
For a leaf ISP at tier T, it is the provider for a fixed number 
of end-users, where each end-user subscribes to one tier T ISP. 
Furthermore, we assume each ISP has at least two subscribers, 
so that local routing is always feasible. 
We define region as the set of nodes which are located at the 
same tier and share the same primary provider ISP. In Figure 
4.1, node A and node B are in the same region; node D and 
node F, node A and node C are in different regions. 
We classify the links into three types: 
1. Transit link: a cross-tier link that connects an ISP node to 
its primary provider ISP at the upper tier. All ISP nodes in 
the same region establish a transit link to the same provider 
ISP. In Figure 4.1, the solid lines represent transit links. 
Node C and node D are both connected to their common 
primary provider ISP node E through different transit links. 
2. Peering link: a link that connects ISPs in the same tier 
within the same region. Peering links are marked as dotted 
lines in Figure 4.1. There is a peering link between node C 
and node D, but there can not be any peering link between 
node D and node F since they are not in the same region. 
3. Multi-homing link: a link that allows an ISP to connect 
to another upper-tier ISP which is different from but in 
the same region as its primary provider ISP. In Figure 4.1, 
multi-homing links are marked as dash lines. Node A estab-
lishes a multi-homing link to node D, but can not establish 
a multi-homing link to node F since it is not in the same 
region as its primary provider ISP node C. 
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Next we define several network topology parameters. First 
we formulate the peering strategy among ISPs in a macroscopic 
manner. For all nodes in the same region, we assume that there 
either does not exist any peering link, or there is a peering link 
between any pair of nodes such that they form a full mesh topol-
ogy.^ We denote p = {p„, Vn G AT} as the set of probabilities 
that such mesh connection of peering links exists at the region of 
each node n. Notice that if two nodes n and m are in the same 
region, then pn = Pm- Since in practice the topmost tier (tier 
1) nodes are typically interconnected into a full mesh through 
peering links ([20], [32])’ we let Pn = I for all nodes n € M . 
We denote the multi-homing degree d = {d几’ Vn G M} as the 
number of high-tier ISPs that each node n connects to. When 
dn = 1, ISP n only connects to its primary provider ISP and 
thus there is no multi-homing. In Figure 4.1, dc = do = ^ and 
dA = dB = 2. We assume that a node is able to use any of its 
multi-homing links to deliver traffic to all destinations.^ 
In later sections, we will denote a topology Q as (T, A/‘, p, d). 
The list of parameters used in the paper can be found in Table 
4.1. 
4.2.2 Traffic Model 
We adopt the traffic model used in [21]. In this model, only 
end-users (who subscribe to the leaf tier T ISPs) are able to 
initiate and terminate traffic (i.e., act as source and destination). 
To formulate this user-to-user traffic, we use a parameter a to 
illustrate how far the traffic is likely to go, instead of specifying 
the exact destination of the traffic. 
2The "either none or full mesh" assumption is used to guarantee all traffic that need 
to go from one ISP node to another ISP node in the same region experience the same hop 
count: either two-hop by going through the primary provider ISP or one-hop by going 
through one of the peering links. 
^This assumption is used to simplify the calculation of Shapiey value. In reality, how-
ever, there may be some destinations that only some of the multi-homing links can rcach. 
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For node n G A/‘, there is a probability an for the traffic to go 
local with intensity In. For example in Figure 4.1, when an end-
user of node A has traffic parameter a, his traffic terminates at 
another end-user of node A with probability a', goes to node C 
with probability (1 — a), and terminates at an end-user of node 
B with probability a{l — a). The furthest a traffic can go is with 
probability (1 — a广，which the traffic reaches an end-user that 
needed to transverse through a peering link at tier 1. 
We assume BGP routing is used in the network. In BGP 
routing, ISPs connected with peering links only exchange routes 
of its customers to each other. As a result, traffic routes in 
the hierarchical model have hill-shape appearances (e.g., [14])-
they go uphill until the highest necessary tier, go fiat through 
the peering link if needed, and go downhill to the destination. 
Because of this, the smallest number of tiers that a traffic reaches 
essentially determines the distance of that traffic. 
4.3 Settlement Model and Definition of Fair 
Price 
Next we describe the two settlement mechanisms to be stud-
ied in this paper, namely the bilateral peering settlement model 
(simplified as Bilateral) and the Shapley value cooperative set-
tlement model (simplified as Shapley). Then we define a set 
of fair prices that lead to the same revenue division in both 
settlement mechanisms. 
4.3.1 Bilateral Settlement 
Bilateral is the settlement that is being used in the current Inter-
net. In Bilateral, the charging between two ISPs are determined 
by mutual agreements [3 . 
Let us first consider the charging between end-user and leaf 
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Table 4.1: Parameters used in the model 
Topology model 
T Number of tiers in the model 
Af = e { 1 , . . . , T } } Set of ISP nodes in the model 
p = Vn G A/‘} Probability of existing peering 
links in mesh in the region 
d = {dn, Vn 6 A/‘} Multi-homing factor - number of 
upstream connections 
Q A topology of parameters 
Traffic model 
an, n E J^ Probability that the traffic goes 
local 
In^nE M Intensity of traffic 
(a, b) A traffic from source a to destina-
tion b 
Settlement model 
7 Bilateral charing per unit traffic. 
<;n, ipniK Af Shapley value 
j^n, n E A/‘ Betweennes 
P* = {Pt^te [ 1 , . . . , T - 1]} The fair price 
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tier T ISPs, which is the same in both settlement schemes. We 
assume that each end-user generates the same amount of traffic 
to the network, and is charged a fixed amount Pf by its provider 
ISP at tier T. The total amount of revenue collected from all 
end-users in the whole network is denoted as Pa. 
For settlements between ISPs, we consider a per-traffic tier-
based charging scheme. The precise charging scheme depends 
on the type of link between the two ISPs. Note that for sim-
plicity we assume that the price is tier-dependent but not node-
dependent. This is justified in a macroscopic view that ISPs in 
the same tier have similar size and thus have similar negotiation 
power in coming to a bilateral price. If the link is either a tran-
sit link or multi-homing link between tier t provider ISP and its 
tier t + 1 customers, a charge Pt is paid by the customer to the 
provider for per-unit of traffic regardless of the traffic direction. 
If the link is a peering link between two ISPs, no charging is 
involved for any traffic sent over this link in either direction. 
For the ease of later discussions, let us calculate the revenue 
obtained by an ISP n at tier t for handling (i.e., receiving and 
sending) one unit of traffic as the following: 
‘2Pt , for local traffic, 
7n’t(_P) = Pt, for peering traffic, 
� P t - Pt-h for upstream traffic, 
for ^ E [ 1 , . . . , T - 1], and 
( p ) I —Pt-i, for upstream traffic, 
1 0, for local/peering traffic, 
where P= {Pt,Vt G { 1 , . . . , T - 1 } } . 
For example, in Figure 4.1, node C at tier 2 earns 2尸2 when 
it handles a local traffic such as the one from A to B through 
C, earns P2 when it handles peering traffic such as one from A 
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to D, and earns P2 — Pi for upstream traffic such as A to E. 
For other traffic that does not pass through node C, it earns 
nothing. As leaf ISPs already obtain flat rate charging Pf from 
the end-users, they do not obtain any additional traffic-based 
revenue from the end-users. In Figure 4.1, node A loses no 
revenue when the traffic goes to end-users of node A and B(if 
there exists a peering link between A and B). It however needs 
to pay Pt-1 when the traffic goes upstream. 
In this settlement method, each ISP keeps a traffic counter at 
its ingress links to record the total amount of traffic handled at 
each link. At a specific clearance time, typically once a month, 
ISP t charges their customer ISPs Pt times the traffic passed 
through their transit/multi-homing links. 
4.3.2 Shapley Settlement 
Shapley is the settlement that divides the revenue among ISPs 
according to Shapley value. It is previously studied in [28], 
where the authors showed several nice properties of implement-
ing such settlement in the Internet. 
Shapley value uses an axiomatic approach to allocate benefits 
obtained from a coalition among all participating players. It 
satisfies the following four axioms: 
1. Efficiency, players distribute among themselves the re-
source available to grand coalition. 
2. Symmetry: if two players are symmetric, their payoffs are 
the same. 
3. Dummy, dummy player receive no payoff. 
4. Additivity: the Shapley value of a combined game is equal 
to the Shapley value of the separated games. 
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The Shapley value is proofed to be the unique solution that sat-
isfying the above four axioms. Detailed information on Shapley 
value can be found in Shapley [38] and Winter [43 . 
Shapley is similar as Bilateral in terms of how the end-user 
is charged (i.e., flat-rate charging with Pf for each user and Pa 
for all users). The key difference is how different ISPs settle 
the charge among each other. Instead of charging differently 
for provider-customer relationship and peer-to-peer relationship, 
Shapley divides the revenue obtained from the end-users "among 
ISPs by calculating the Shapley value of each ISP for each flow 
of traffic. The calculation of Shapley value is formally defined 
as follows: 
Definition 4.3.1 (Shapley value). The Shapley value that 
node n E Af obtains through handling traffic (a, b) (i.e., end-
user a to end-user b) is: 
' ireAT 
where is the total number of nodes in the network, tt 
is the set of possible permutations of A/", S is the subset of 
ISP nodes in a permutation that appears earlier than n, and 
a, b) is the characteristic function of Shapley value for the 
traffic from a to b under the sub-topology formed by the set 
S. We first note that Shapley value is always between 0 and 
1. Furthermore, Shapley value calculates the contribution of a 
player (a node in our case) as the normalized marginal contribu-
tion under all possible ways of including it into a set of nodes Af. 
The measurement of worthiness is reflected by the characteristic 
function as defined next: 
Definition 4.3.2 (Characteristic function of Shapley value). 
The characteristics function v(.) for a set of nodes S handling 
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a truffic from a to b is: 
1 ， if there exists a path in S that 
v{S, a, b) = connects a to b, 
�0，otherwise . 
This characteristic function concerns whether the traffic can 
be completed with set S. When there is already a complete 
route from source to destination a, h) = 1), all extra nodes 
that join S later have zero marginal contribution {v(S'^ a, h)— 
a, b) = 0 , < S ' � S ) , as they are considered redundant in 
terms of providing connectivity. Two examples of Shapley value 
is shown at Figure 4.2a and 4.2b. When we consider a traffic 
from an end-user of node A to an end-user of node B. The con-
nectivity breaks when either A or B is removed. However, the 
connectivity remains when either C or D is removed. Therefore, 
A and B have greater contribution than C and D, thus they 
obtain greater Shapley values. 
To precisely implement the Shapley settlement, it is necessary 
to have a centralized network entity who calculates for 
each ISP n for each traffic (a，6). At a specific clearance time, 
each ISP node uses the aggregated Shapley value calculated at 
the central entity to claim its portion of the total revenue Pa. 
Based on the hierarchical model presented in this paper and 
BGP routing, it is possible to calculate the Shapley value based 
on a smaller set of parameters related to the traffic (a, b) as 
follows: 
Definition 4.3.3. The Shapley value of n can he reformulated 
as 
where h is the height for traffic (a,b) (i.e. how far upstream 
the traffic goes), q G {0 ,1 } is the topmost peering parameter 
which states whether the traffic goes through a peering link at its 
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中(2, 1 , d ) qj(2，0,d) 
A 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.2: An example of how Shapley value is calculated. We consider a 
traffic from an end-user of node A to an end-user of node B, and calculate 
the Shapley value of each node with respect to such traffic. Here the multi-
homing factors are set as d : = {2 ,2 } in (a) and { 1 , 1 } in (b). 
maximum height, and d is the set of multi-homing factor for all 
nodes n G M. 
Figure 4.2a and 4.2b show examples of how the parameters 
h and q are set for different traffic and topologies. 
4.4 Fair Price Achieving the Shapley Value; 
The Symmetric Case 
The Shapley value is known as the fair way to distribute contri-
butions among a group of players. However, adopting Shapley 
value in the current Internet is challenging since it requires the 
ISPs to first form a coalition, and besides the Shapley settle-
ment requires centralized computation. Nevertheless, before we 
contemplate the likelihood of such a development, it would be 
helpful to find out the possibility of achieving the same revenue 
distribution as Shapley through the current Bilateral scheme, 
under suitably chosen prices. 
In this section, we calculate the traffic-based price for each 
tier such that Bilateral produces the same revenue distribution 
as Shapley. We define the set of corresponding prices P* as the 
fair prices: 
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Definition 4.4.1 (Fair price). The fair price P* 二 {P:，t G 
1 , . . . , T — 1]} is the set of tier-based prices that make the ex-
pected revenue distribution in Bilateral equal to Shapley for all 
tiers T, i.e., 
PaE E PM)�nM) 
neTVt (a,6)eR 
- X I E P(a,6)7n,^(P*) + PaX l{t=T}yt G {1, . . . , T } , 
neMt (a,6)€R 
where R is the set of all possible source-destination pairs, P(a, h) 
is the probability that traffic (a, b) happens, and is the indi-
cator function. 
In the rest of the paper, we will consider how the fair prices 
can be calculated in both symmetric and asymmetric topologies, 
as well as some nice properties of the fair prices (using symmetric 
topology as an example). After that, we will consider how the 
fair prices can be approximated in a distributed fashion based 
on only local information. 
We first consider a symmetric topology, Q^  = 
where p® = {pt, t 6 T}. In this topology, each node in the same 
tier t shares the same peering parameter pt and all nodes of 
all tiers share the same multi-homing parameter d. For traffic 
parameters, we assume all ISPs have the same traffic parameter 
a, the total traffic intensity in the network is normalized to 1. 
Theorem 4.4.2. The fair price in a symmetric hierar-
chical topology gs = (:r’A/"，p�oO is: 
W ) = 2(1 -apM) + r^eer + r ^ r } 
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z \ z 
P‘1 = o-isa = 0.133 
hM^hMbMb 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.3: Numerical examples of calculating fair price. We consider a 
three-tier model, the end-users are omitted in the figure. We let Pa = 1, 
a = 0.5. Without loss of generality we draw all possible traffic (in terms of 
height travelled) initialized by node A by dash arrows, (a) shows the fair 
prices when yOa = 0 and (b) show the fair prices when ps = 1. 
Vi G {1,...,T- 1},where 
r 贫 " = 2 t { i - a Y M T A , d \ 
r『-杯er = — l ) a ( l - a 广 1(1 - p许2 - i ) X 
i=l 
t-i 
r � = 2 i a ( l - afpt+i^i - t + z, 1, c/). 
This theorem is proofed by dynamic programming, which is 
omitted in this paper. Here Tgf^ is the Shapley value corre-
sponding to the traffic passing through the peered links in iiiesli 
at tier 1 times the probability of these traffic happens. This 
term is unique since we have assumed that the tier 1 nodes form 
a full mesh network through peering links with probability 1, 
thus is different from all other tiers. r�Pee i jg related to the 
Shapley value of all traffic going higher than tier t but do not 
use peering links at the highest height. is related to the 
Shapley value of traffic that passes through peering links at the 
traffic's highest height. 
Through rearranging the equations in Theorem (4.4.2), we 
obtain the following relationship that sheds more light on the 
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economic meaning of the fair price P*: 
2 ( 1 - 明 力 * = 
Pa{ Y^ P ( a , 6 ) ^ + 2(1 - a ) ( l -
(a,6)GR neNt 
where the term 2(1 - apt+i) denotes the total traffic inten-
sity(both upstream and downstream traffic) between all ISPs at 
tier t and tier 亡 + 1. The first term in the braces is the Shapiey 
value of all ISPs at tier t considering all traffic in the network. 
The second term in the braces is the Shapiey value of the higher 
tiers (from tier 1 to ^ - 1). The term 2(1 - a ) ( l - apt) rep-
resents the total traffic between tier t ISPs and their provider 
ISPs, and the fair price is the price that makes this bi-
lateral settlement equals to Shapiey value at tier t - 1. As a 
result, the fair price at tier t is to find the per-traffic price that 
accounts the contribution of tier t, plus the price that contains 
the contribution of the upper tiers so that the upper tiers can 
achieve Shapiey by charging tier t ISPs P 众 . P r o m the second 
term of the braces, we can see that long distance routes are more 
expensive to transport (i.e. need to be charged at higher prices). 
It is because when the path is longer, more revenue is needed to 
carry the portion that belongs to the rest of the contributors in 
the route. 
By this formulation, the fair price at tier t is to account the 
contribution of tier t ISPs (first term on the right), plus the 
price that contains the contribution of the upper tiers (second 
term on the right) so that the upper tiers can achieve Shapiey 
by charging tier t ISPs P；々 We then obtain the per-traffic 
based fair price by dividing the contributions by the total traffic 
intensity between all ISPs at tier t and tier t + 1 (the term on 
the left). 
Figure 4.3 shows a numerical example of calculating the fair 
prices. When peering links are established at tier 3 in Figure 
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4.3b, the fair price of tier 2 increases. When p3 = 1, shorter 
routes like A to C will not pass througli tier 2 ISP B. Since the 
fair price is the average per-traffic price of handling a traffic, 
losing the relatively cheap short distance traffic raises the aver-
age per-traffic price. Note that the actual revenue of tier 2 has 
decreased when pa = 1 as they handle less traffic. 
Since using fair price in bilateral settlement helps obtaining 
Shapley value, which is the fair allocation of revenues based on 
different nodes' contribution, we could use this fair price as one 
of the factors to determine the reasonable per-traffic price in the 
negotiation of bilateral agreements. 
4.5 Properties of the Fair Prices in the Sym-
metric Case 
Under fair prices, Bilateral achieves the same revenue distribu-
tion as Shapley. Next we show that fair prices exhibits nice 
properties in the system parameters. 
4.5.1 Sensitivity to traffic pattern a 
Proposition 4.5.1. The fair price P* is decreasing ina e (0,1 
for any t G [1 , . . . , T — 1 . 
The proposition is proofed by mathematical induction on the 
derivative of the fair price on a, which is not shown in this paper. 
Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between the fair price P* and 
a by calculating the fair prices across a. When a increases, 
the traffic is more likely to go local, and thus is more likely 
to be handled by tiers that are closer to the leaf tiers. As a 
result, ISPs of tiers higher on the hierarchy have less chance to 
contribute to the connectivity of the traffic, thus it makes sense 
for them to charge less. On the other hand, when a decreases, 
a traffic tends to travel further away. In the extreme case where 
CHAPTER 4. PROBLEMS IN REVENUE DISTRIBUTING STAGE 66 
ra- 1 1 1 |i 1 二丨 
0.1 • 一 P3. 
差 、 ^ 
0.05 • ' 、 、 ^ ^ " " " " ^ ^ ^ 
— . 寺 一 务 一 一 ：、\C：：：；；^' 
、 叫 
•0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
a 
Figure 4.4: Fair price P^ verses a for different tier t: the fair price is decreas-
ing in a. 
0.14| ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 
� 0.08 ^ ""+"*••*•-� : . 
差 0.06 . + P : i — - 一 . Z ： 
“ n,_ ..一 * 
0.04(; * ——e e——e——-e e •€> (子——<> 
+ P3 
0.02 • 口 p* 
4 
OQ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Peering probability of tier 3 (p ) 
Figure 4.5: P : verses peering probability of tier 3 (ps) for different tier t: the 
fair price of tier t is decreasing in pt 
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a approaches 0, all traffic travel to the farthest distance (i.e., 
through peering links in tier 1), and thus all tiers contribute 
equally to the connectivity and have the same revenue. This 
is reflected by the equal price difference across different tiers 
(A* - A* = Pi - Pi, etc.). 
4.5.2 Sensitivity to network topology parameters p and 
d 
Proposition 4.5.2. The fair price P* is decreasing in pt G 
(0,1) for any t e [1,...，T-1]. 
The proof is derived by a simple differentiation that is not 
shown here. Figure 4.5 shows an mathematical example of how 
the fair prices of different tiers change as a function of the peer-
ing probability of tier 3 ISPs p3. When ps increases, more traffic 
passes through the peering link in tier 3 without using services 
from their provider ISPs. Paying less to the upstream ISPs re-
duces the fair price of tier 3 ISPs. With the same argument, the 
fair price of the lower tiers below tier 3 reduces as well. 
The fair price of tier 2, on the other hand, increases when p^  
increases. As explained in the numerical example in Figure 4.3, 
it is because the average traffic price increases when tier 2 ISPs 
handle less shorter distance traffic. 
Before we mention the sensitivity of the multi-homing factor 
d, we could like to introduce the concept of betweenness, as 
an indicator to characterize the importance of an ISP node as 
follows: 
Definition 4.5.3 (Betweenness). The betweenness of a node 
n with respect to traffic (a, h) is: 
a[a,n,b) 
Bn{a,b)= � cr(a, 0, b) 
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where a{a, n, b) is the number of routes from a to 6 that 
pass through node n. If n = 0, then cr(a, 0, b) denotes the total 
number of routes from a to b. It is clear that Ba{a, b) and Bb{a, b) 
are always equal to 1. 
Observation 4.5.4. The Shapley value of an ISP n increases in 
multi-homing factor d if its betweenness Bn = I, and decreases 
in d if its betweenness Bn < I- Furthermore, P* ^ 0 when 
d —> oo. 
Figure 4.6 shows the differences in Shapley value between a 
vital player (betweenness B = I) and a non-vital player {B < 1) 
for varies d. When d increases, the Shapley value of non-vital 
ISPs decreases significantly since there are more alternative ways 
for providing connectivity, while the Shapley value of vital ISPs 
increases significantly since they remain the necessary compo-
nents for any choice of connectivity. 
Figure 4.7 shows that P* drops dramatically when d increases 
and flattens quickly for d > 5, as this connectivity-focused char-
acteristic function gives little value to non-vital ISPs. For 
the only vital players for each traffic are the initiating ISP and 
the terminating ISP. In this scenario, initiating leaf ISP and the 
terminating leaf ISP at tier T collect most of the revenue from 
handling the traffic, leaving the rest of the non-vital upper tier 
ISPs little revenue to share. This explains why we have P* 0 
when d oo. In this extreme case, there are infinite number 
of paths that can be used to transmit the same traffic, thus 
the contribution of a non-vital ISP on any particular path to 
connectivity is virtually zero. 
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4.6 Fair Price Achieving the Shapley Value: 
The Asymmetric Case 
In the previous section, we analyzed the fair price and its impli-
cations in symmetric setting. This price, however, is not feasible 
for ISPs to choose as a fair indicator. In order to use the fair 
price in the Internet, we need to overcome two issues: First, to 
consider a more realistic scenario, where an asymmetric topology 
similar to the Internet is analyzed; Second, to relax the central-
ized requirement of calculating Shapley value, so that the fair 
price can be calculated by merely using local information. We 
will explain the works we have done in this two areas in the 
following section. 
Here we relax the symmetric network assumption in Sections 
4.5 and 4.4, and show how the fair price is determined in the 
asymmetric case. Here we consider a general topology model 
g = {T,J\f,p,d), where p G {pn’Vn € A/‘} and d e G 
J\f}. In terms of traffic model, each ISP node n uses parameters 
(an, In) to describe the traffic passing through it. The fair price 
in this asymmetric case, P*(0) , can be calculated as follows: 
Theorem 4.6.1. The fair price of an ISP at tier t in an asym-
metric topology Q 二（T’A/" , p , d) is: 
• 二 E 
{ r 沪 " + r f -评 e r + rg^^'jvt e { i , . . .，T — i } , 
where A/^ 爪 is the set of ISPs at tier t that has ISP m as its 
provider ISP (through either transit links or multi-homing links). 
The three pricing terms in Theorem (4.6.1) can be similarly 
derived as in Theorem (4.4.2), and is not shown in this paper. 
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4.7 Distributed and Local Approximation of 
the Fair Price 
In order to calculate the fair prices based on either Theorem 
(4.4.2) (symmetric case) or Theorem (4.6.1) (asymmetric case), 
we require global information such as the full network topology, 
which is impractical to obtain in the Internet. Next we illustrate 
a distributed approximation scheme that allows each node to 
calculate the fair price with limited local information. 
For a node n at tier t, it calculates an approximated fair 
price based on the following inputs: 1) the price charged 
by its provider ISPs at tier 力一1 2) the incoming traffic 
pattern (a^, Vm G A/i; 3) the betweenness Bm of all nodes 
m G M , and 4) a heuristic approximation of peering parameters 
P't,t e i 2 ’ … 卜 1 } . . 
The fair price can be approximated by 
^ p/tierl jVguess + p/ticrt + pBilateral (4 1) 
where and g^e the approximated Shapley value of 
traffic to tier 1 ISPs and tier t ISPs respectively, r � 雌 ig the 
approximated Shapley value of traffic that goes to heights be-
tween tier 2 and tier 力—1, which requires p[ for approximation. 
pBilateral jg the precise price that tier t ISPs pay their provider 
ISPs for all upstream traffic. Description of terms of Equation 
(4.1) is shown in Appendix A.2.3 
This approximation is based on two observations. First, we 
approximate the original Shapley value function q, d) by 
功二(T, Bri), which requires only local information to compute. We 
can think of the betweenness B as the number of competitors 
of node n. The more multi-homing links from the subscriber 
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ISPs of node n, the smaller value of betweenness of node n. The 
second observation is that a general idea of how each tier peers 
is feasible to obtain, and sufficient to calculate a close fair price. 
As shown in Figure 4.5，the fair prices do not significantly change 
for two close therefore we can use a heuristic approximation 
to replace this piece of information. 
The limited information from the above tier and all peers 
within the same tier enables us to precisely calculate r � r i (Shap-
ley value obtained by tier-1 nodes), r沪rt(^Shapiey value obtained 
by tier t nodes), and r^iatemi(price charged from the upper tiers 
in Bilateral). The term rfess (Shapiey value of tier 2 to tier 
t — 1 ISPs) is calculated based on a heuristic approximation of 
the peering pattern of other tiers. 
To illustrate the performance of the approximation, we sim-
ulate a four-tier topology where the real peering parameter and 
heuristic approximation of the peering pattern are both inde-
pendently and randomly generated. We use the following ap-
proximation for the Shapiey value calculation: 
where d'n = { 3 , . . . , dn, • •., 3}, i.e., assuming all tiers have the 
same multi-homing factor equal to 3, except the value at the 
力 + 1 tier which is approximated by dn. 
Figure 4.8 shows that the approximation is very accurate in 
this random case, where the difference is no larger than 8% 
(Figure 4.9). If the peering parameters are estimated according 
to some network statistics instead of just random guessing, then 
the performance of the approximation is likely to be further 
improved. 
• End of chapter. 
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Figure 4.8: Simulated performance of the distributed approximation scheme 
for the fair price. Here we consider a four-tier topology with randomly chosen 
true and approximated peering parameters. 
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Figure 4.9: The difference between real and approximated fair prices of dif-
ferent tiers in percentage for Figure 4.8 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
In this work, we divided our discussion on the economic revenue 
model in the future Internet into two stages. In the revenue 
collecting stage, we addressed the issue of network inefficiency 
in the current Internet. We analyzed how the concept of insur-
ance can be introduced to Internet pricing, such that the novel 
pricing mechanisms, for instance congestion pricing, are feasible 
to implement in both users' and ISP's perspective. 
We discussed two types of insurance in this work. The first 
type of insurance focuses on price stability. By purchasing this 
insurance, users can enjoy a discount rate for the congestion 
charge incurred for the next period. The second type of insur-
ance focuses on data rate stability. By purchasing this insurance, 
users can obtain a guaranteed bandwidth for the next period re-
gardless of the network situation. 
We analyzed the appropriate insurance functions for both 
types of insurance, and determined the optimal choices of the 
insurances by users with different elasticities and risk adversities. 
We showed that when some premium is required for users to 
purchase full insurance for price stability, ISPs can minimize 
the possibilities of moral hazard bought to the system. Also, 
by correctly setting the per-unit bandwidth price for data rate 
stability, we are able to provide guaranteed bandwidth service to 
users with important applications, and on the other hand help 
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ISPs to break even when there is no congestion in the network. 
For future work in this section, we can discuss the practical 
issues of implementing insurance in the Internet. We can start 
the analysis by checking the existing pricing contracts in the 
networking/telecommunication business to gain more insights 
on how the concept of insurance can be introduced. In another 
direction, we can verify this mechanism for distributed, large 
scale environment such as the Internet, and to determine the 
algorithm to perform the insurance mechanism. 
The second stage we mentioned in this work is the revenue 
distributing stage. We showed that the current bilateral method 
to distribute revenue does not distribute revenue fairly according 
to network players' contribution. We try to answer the follow-
ing question: is it possible to set the proper bilateral prices so 
that a fair revenue distribution among ISPs can be achieved 
using the revenue settlement mechanism used in the current 
Internet? Through both careful analysis and extensive simu-
lations, we have obtained positive preliminary answers to this 
question. We show that by setting the bilateral charging based 
on global topology and traffic information for each ISP tier, 
the current bilateral settlement distribution leads to Shapley 
value, which is widely regarded as a fair cooperative revenue 
distribution method. We further show that such fair prices are 
reasonable to be adopted in the Internet, as it shows sensible 
properties to parameter changes. In terms of feasibility to be 
implemented, we show that the fair price can be approximated 
using local information. 
There are several possible directions of extending the cur-
rent work in this section. One direction is to consider different 
characteristic functions and analyze the properties of Shapley 
settlement in that case. The other direction is to study the in-
centive for ISPs to implement the Shapley settlement in realistic 
network scenarios. 
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• End of chapter. 
Appendix A 
Mathematical Proofs 
A. l Mathematical Proof for Chapter 3 
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3.2 
We proof this theorem by applying the definition of actuarially 
fair in Definition 3.3.1. The indemnification is the portion of 
congestion charge that is being insured and is paid by the in-




r = l 
pE 
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.5 
We let the maximization problem of a risk-averse user in Equa-
tion (3.1) be g and denote the expected utility function \/似(.). 
As is concave, the maximization problem can be solved 
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by setting the first derivative of g to zero: 
g = max pV^'^lw - m - r(m)E) + (1 - m) 
m 
二 maxpV丑 — m - (1 _ 宗)E) + (1 — 一 m) 
TTt J 
衾 = … 爪 — ( 1 —罢)五） 
the second line of the deviation is obtained by substituting the 
coinsurance function r(m) calculated in the previous subsec-
tion. As 1/以(•）is concave, strictly increasing and unique, when 
= VRA^V)^ essentially x = y. We then obtain: 
/ 爪、rn 
w — m — [1 ———)E = w — m 
E 
m* = E 
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3.6 
We denote the expected utility function of a risk-seeking user be 
V你(.)• As we can observe that the maximization problem in 
Equation (3.1) is to find the utility value in between V^^ [w 一 
m - r{m)E) and — m). Intuitively, as VRS{-) is convex, 
the maximum value of Equation (3.1) happens at the positive 
boundary of the utility function. Therefore the best response 
of risk-seeking users is to maximize — m), that is to set 
m* = 0. 
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3.7 
Since risk neutral users do not have special preference to risk and 
actuarially fair rate gives the same mean payment for users with 
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different insurance charge, it is not necessary for risk neutral 
users to purchase any insurance, or in other words, they have 
the same utility surplus by any insurance charge m. 
We denote the expected utility function of a risk-neutral user 
be As is a linear function, we generalize the 
function as = Sx to illustrate the above concept: 
p6(^w - m — r[m)E) + (1 一 p)6{w - m) 
max爪 5w — 8m — pdr(m)E 
777/ 
=4> max^ 6w — 5m - p5{l _ •—)E 
Jb 
maxm Sw — p6E 
As the maximization problem is independent of the insurance 
payment m, the optimal insurance charge m* can be any value 
in (0,E). 
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4.1 
The proof follows the fact that the demand function D{-) is 
a monotonic decreasing and convex function. Therefore, the 
maximum difference happens when r(m) is minimal. That is 
when r(m) = 0, which means m* = E. 
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 3.4.3 
We let the maximization problem in Equation (3.1) be g'. By the 
concavity of the expected utility function of risk-averse users, we 
can solve g' by setting the first derivative of g' to z e r o . � 
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g' = - m - r ^ ( m ) E ) + (1 - - m) 
TTX 
= p{-l + - m - r^[m)E) 
- ( 1 - 丑 � - m ) = 0, 
we let = log(x) as an generic example of a concave func-
tion to continue the calculation. The optimal insurance price mP 
under the premium coinsurance function r^ and a specific utility 
function is: 
TTl — . 
a — p 
the derivative of mP* with respect to a is: 
dmP* pw 2pwa 
•• I  - I . • 
da a — p (a - p)2 
pw� 2a 
= ——1 
ap I a — p 
< 0, 
given that 0 < a < l , 0 < p < l , and it; > 0. Note that the 
function of m *^ is not continuous. 
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 3.4.5 
It is intuitive that risk-seeking users do not purchase any insur-
ance under premium discount rate, given that risk-seeking users 
do not purchase any insurance even under actuarially fair rate. 
For risk neutral users, as V题(.）is linear, we generalize the 
function as = 5x to illustrate their optimal insurance 
payment: 
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max爪 p6{w - m - ^ r(m)E) + (1 - p)8[iu — m) 
teT 
_ r rz-i rno\ ^ 
=> maxyn dw — dm — pd[l —)£； 
E 
max爪 6w — p5E - Sm{l — a) 
Since a G (0,1) and m > 0, the optimal response of insurance 
charge rn'* for risk-neutral users are m'* = 0. 
A.2 Mathematical Proof for Chapter 4 
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4.4.2 
The proof is based on mathematical induction. First, we calcu-
late the fair price of tier 1 as 
Pa\2{l - 1, d) + { l - p)mk{J\ 0, d)] 
糊 二 
(A.l) 
Prom tier 2 onward, the revenue of the bilateral settlement 
method requires the pricing information of the upper tier 
Therefore the fair price for tier t is: 
t 
a{l - ay-\l - pt+2-i) MT -力 +、0, d)+ 
i=l (j)巨 Nt 
t-1 
- o O ' A + h Y^ M T + d)+ 
i=i (peMt 
2 ( l - a ) ( l - a A + i ) P ; _ i | . (A.2) 
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The value inside the braces (except the term with is 
the expected Shapley value of ISP nodes through handling the 
traffic injected into tier t, which includes all traffic goes through 
any nodes in tier t. We then solve this recursive equation, and 
obtain the close-form solution of the fair price. 
t i 
i=i j+i 
t-i i >1 
J 2 a { l - a y p t + i - i J 2 E + (A.3) 
i=i i=i (peMt-j+i J 
Since we assume that a multi-homing link can provide con-
nectivity for all traffic from its subscribers, and each ISPs has d 
multi-homing links. Then the betweenness B of each ISP node 
n at all tiers other than the leaf tier is all ISPs at each tier is 
For a leaf tier ISP, the betweenness equals to 1. Therefore we 
are able to simplify Equation (A.3) by grouping the same terms, 
which leads to the final representation in the theorem. 
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A.2.2 Proof of Theorem (4.6.1) 
The terms in the theorem are as follows: 
«=i (peMi 
i=l j=l 辣t-j+i 
t-l i 
r � r 二 E 物 ( 1 - � ” E E p神认T-t + 1�l,d). 
i=i j=i (peM-j+i 
The key idea here is to find the average fair prices of all 
possible traffic sources transversing through all possible subsets 
of the topology. For each ISP m at tier t ^ T, it has a set 
of subscriber ISPs, either established by transit links or multi-
homing links. We denote this set of subscribers as A/Jt. For 
each subscriber ISP n e A / J � i t has a specific set of traffic 
parameters (Ofn，In) experienced by ISP node m. Therefore the 
fair price from node m's perspective is: 
Pt'iG'J = E ^nP:mn)\ (A.4) 
where G^ = (T, Af, p^, d) is the symmetric topology that node 
m thinks about the whole topology based on its own local in-
formation (although the actual topology is asymmetric). We 
calculate the fair price of the traffic from node n, by 
Equation (A.3). As in this asymmetric setting, each node has its 
own multi-homing factor, thus the Shapley value of individual 
nodes are typically different. 
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The final fair price of tier t in this asymmetric case would be 
the value that averaged over all nodes in tier t, i.e., 
= (A.5) 
The final expression in Theorem (4.6.1) can be obtained by 
combining (A.4) and (A.5). 
A.2.3 Terms Description of Equation (4.1) 
The terms of the equation are as follows: 
r f r l = ( 1 - e g 力 ; ^ 郝 灿 
r|丽 二 f ] a “ l — a^y-' E [1 + (1 - - P ^ l X 
i=l <t>eNt 
r f r t 二a n ( l - c g w ；^ ( 1 - P中顺,B巾Y 
(peMt 
=2(1 - - anPt)P:-V 
The above equations are derived from Equation (A.2), after 
taking into consideration of the approximation of Shapley value 
(from ipri{T,q,d) to {ip'^{T,Bn)) and the approximation of the 
peering parameters of other tiers. 
• End of chapter. 
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